Written for History of Philosophy I, Fall 2022.
Prompt
Aristotle develops a view of primary substances - the basic explanatory entities - in
Categories 1-5 as the fundamental subjects of predication. These primary substances are
concrete individuals like Alexander the Great and Bucephalus. Explain and evaluate
Aristotle’s arguments for the priority of primary substances both to entities represented
by the other categories (quality, quantity, etc.) and to secondary substances. Is it a
problem for his view that the subjects of predication are not absolutely independent,
insofar as primary substances (i) always have some qualitative and quantitative features
or others and (ii) are always characterized by (some particular) secondary substances?
Explain why or why not.
In Categories 1-5, Aristotle defines primary substances as the fundamental subjects of predication which cannot “be said of” nor “be in” any other thing (2a13). By mapping linguistic structure to reality, Aristotle concludes that these primary substances must be the basic explanatory entities, since if they do not exist, then no other entities exist (2b5). In this paper, I argue that Aristotle’s linguistic investigation does not accurately represent reality, which prioritizes quantities as more basic explanatory entities than substances.
Although primary substances are always characterized by some particular secondary substances, their priority is justified by Aristotle’s predicative hierarchy: the more informative an account given by a secondary substance, the closer it is to the primary substance it predicates (2b10). By Aristotle’s claim that primary substances are not predicated of any other entity (1b12), the most informative account of a primary substance can only be the substance itself. Hence, the fundamental subjects of predication are the most reasonable candidates for fundamental explanatory entities, at least within the category of substance. This conclusion is implicit in Aristotle’s earlier claim that all entities, including secondary substances, only exist in relation to primary substances (2b5); for example, the substance of man cannot exist without being in relation to some particular man, like Socrates. Thus, we can directly conclude from Aristotle’s linguistic investigation that secondary substances are ontologically dependent on primary substances, while primary substances are ontologically independent entities.
However, Aristotle’s linguistic explanation does not completely justify why he prioritizes primary substances over the features, or non-substantive entities, that they necessarily have. First, Aristotle’s argument is flawed because it reaches the notion of “primary substance” by inducting through levels of predication. His implicit inductive step only proves that if something can be predicated of something else, then it is not ontologically fundamental. This does not provide a positive reason for why primary substances are ontologically fundamental; moreover, primary substances, which cannot be predicated further, fail the condition for the inductive claim itself. In the following paragraphs, I will build off this explanatory gap to argue for the existence of a more fundamental explanatory entity: quantity.
I begin with Aristotle’s second definition for fundamental subjects of predication: “It is indisputably true that each [primary substance] signifies a this; for what is revealed is an individual and numerically one” (3b11). By this notion, I claim things that are a “this,” or concrete individuals, only exist insofar as they are “individual and numerically one” in reality. What is “individual and numerically one” is a discrete quantity, or quantitative entity. Hence, no concrete individuals exist without “being in” a discrete quantity. It follows that concrete individuals cannot be primary, since they are ontologically dependent on quantities. To clarify this point, consider a cup of water, which only exists in virtue of being in a discrete “cup” volume. Hence, quantity gives an account of everything that is a “this.”
Aristotle may object to the priority of quantity over substance by claiming that only predication from a substance is synonymous (3a35). Meanwhile, predication from a quantity, like predication from any non-substantive entity, is homonymous; for example, an instance of grammatical knowledge and a “this” are both named “individual and one in number,” yet their accounts belong to different ways of being. Hence, quantity provides an incomplete description and is ontologically inferior to substance. However, this objection assumes quantity is indeed a category; that is, quantity is one of several modes of predication of the same ontological priority (1b25), with the exception of substance, which is not in any subject (3a10). The objection fails because Aristotle’s linguistically-constructed categories do not accurately represent reality.
If each category is a mode of predication, then no single entity receives an account from multiple categories. Concrete individuals certainly cannot “be in” other categorical entities, since, as the fundamental subjects of predication, they are the most substantive entities of all. Hence, either substance or quantity is not a category; that is, one of these modes of predication is prior. As I showed before, concrete individuals cannot be in reality without being in a discrete quantity. Hence, predication from a quantity is prior to other modes of predication, including substance. Aristotle’s objection fails because, in the structure of reality, quantities are not entities of a category but more basic explanatory entities for other kinds of being.
By evaluating Aristotle’s linguistic arguments for the priority of primary substances, particularly to non-substantial entities, I have shown that what is fundamental in predication is not necessarily fundamental in reality. In particular, I argued that concrete individuals, or substances that are “a this,” are ontologically dependent on their quantitative accounts. Ultimately, my argument demonstrates how investigation by language alone leaves explanatory gaps, which opens the possibility of alternate metaphysical truths.