Infants non-inferentially share affective states with their caregivers because they have not yet developed a distinct self-concept: “Newborns do not even have a developed body schema that would allow them to determine where their body ends and the caregiver’s begins” (@2024buckner, p. 328). Note, however, that the infant can already modify the caregiver’s affect through communication, resulting in a reciprocal coupling.
In developmental psychology, the development of a self-other distinction is seen as a key cognitive milestone.
In his discussion an empiricist approach to artificial intelligence, @2024buckner uses this as evidence for an empiricist theory of social cognition based on the work of Adam Smith and Sophie De Grouchy.
- Does this imply that animals which are born with more independence (or at least, shorter juvenile stages) than humans are less likely to have empathy or theory-of-mind? If so, how are they able to recognize other agents and members of their own species?
- What is the relationship between mentalizing and imagination?
- Given that such a developmental process seems innate, how can we realistically implement this in designing artificial agents with a faculty for social cognition?