Overview
Reductionism is the view that mental phenomena are irrelevant in scientific (psychological) theories since mental descriptions can be replaced by descriptions of behavioral or physical processes.
Physicalism is the view that mental phenomena are ultimately physical entities, which are describable by physics.
| Basic definition | Oppositions | Reductionist | Physicalist | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interactionist substance dualism | Mind and body are separate substances | Unclear how the immaterial mind interacts with material body/world | ✖ | ✖ |
| Behaviorism | Mental states can be reduced to behaviors, or behavioral dispositions | ✔ | ✔ | |
| Token physicalism (mind/brain identity theory) | Every token mental state is identical to a token brain state; that is, every token state is identical to some brain state, but the same type of token does not necessarily map onto the same brain state | Weaker than type physicalism; “anarchy” | ✔ | ✔ |
| Type physicalism (mind/brain identity theory) | Every type of mental state is identical to a type of brain state (e.g., every instance of pain is equivalent to C-fibers firing) | Can’t really talk about beliefs more generally; plausible that things can have the same mental state while being physically different | ✔ | ✔ |
| Functionalism | Every mental state is constituted by its causal relation to other mental states | ✖ | ✔ |
Related notes: Computationalist, connectionist, and rational research traditions in cognitive science
Selected passages
- @1974fodorSpecial: “For, it seems increasingly likely that there are nomologically possible systems other than organisms (namely, automata) which satisfy natural kind predicates in psychology, and which satisfy no neurological predicates at all. … The upshot is that the classical formulation of the unity of science is at the mercy of progress in the field of computer simulation. This is, of course, simply to say that that formulation was too strong. The unity of science was intended to be an empirical hypothesis, defeasible by possible scientific findings. But no one had it in mind that it should be defeated by Newell, Shaw and Simon.” (106)
References
- @2011kimMind, “Mind as a Computing Machine”
- @1974fodorSpecial, “The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis”
Notes
- Functionalism implies multiple realizability.